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Summary 
There is a tendency to view the CDEP scheme as unsuccessful when measured in 
predominantly economic terms, and in particular against its ability to reduce 
welfare dependence by reducing unemployment. However, it can be suggested 
that the scheme is quite successful in non-economic terms, as it appears to 
increase Indigenous political autonomy. By introducing the concepts of negative 
and positive autonomy, this paper proposes that it is legitimate to consider the 
scheme as relatively successful in terms of its political outcomes, even if it does 
little to reduce welfare dependence. 
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Introduction 
Indigenous people suffer from high unemployment, and many are unemployed in 
the long term. The attendant high levels of Indigenous dependence on welfare 
payments, at least those related to unemployment, are generally viewed negatively 
(see Folds 2001: 41; Pearson 2000). It has also been suggested that a high level of 
welfare dependence legitimises and increases government involvement in, and 
control of, Indigenous people’s lives, to the extent that it can be characterised as 
another form of colonialism—‘welfare colonialism’ (Beckett 1987). However, 
against this is the fact that the welfare system also provides a cushion against the 
poverty which normally accompanies unemployment. In addition, the welfare 
system may, especially when applied in the remote areas of Australia, provide a 
level of autonomy for Indigenous people. 
The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme was 
introduced some 25 years ago as an alternative to unemployment benefits for 
Indigenous people in remote regions. The scheme arose out of two concerns. 
Policy makers in the field of Indigenous affairs and some Indigenous community 
leaders were concerned that residents were obtaining unemployment benefits 
without doing any work;1 and the government was concerned about the ongoing 
Indigenous dependence on welfare transfers for income (Morphy & Sanders 2001: 
1). The scheme started in 1977 with 100 participants and has grown to presently 
include around 31,000 (see Fig. 1). Statistically, the scheme lowers the national 
Indigenous unemployment rate from around 43 per cent to 23 per cent (Hunter & 
Taylor 2001: 119; Taylor & Hunter 2001: 98). However, the basis of the scheme is 
that a notional equivalent of people’s unemployment benefits (plus an 
administrative loading) is passed to their community or organisation, which then 
determines what work they will do. Thus, although the participants perform  
work for what is basically their unemployment entitlements, the scheme has a 
welfare base. 
Assessments of the scheme’s success have not been entirely positive. This is 
largely because it is failing to move people into the mainstream labour market 
(Shergold 2001: 70; Spicer 1997). Indeed, dependency on the scheme for all 
employment is increasing. In 1991 it accounted for 14 per cent of all Indigenous 
employment; this proportion rose to 20.6 per cent in 1996 and is projected to 
reach 27 per cent by 2006 (Taylor & Hunter 1998: 16, 17). Therefore, in terms of 
reducing welfare dependency, the scheme is not terribly successful. Placing the 
scheme within the present government’s Indigenous Economic Policy, one 
commentator noted that:  
The objective is to encourage CDEPs to support participants in progressing to 
mainstream employment. How successful has it been? It has been an abysmal 
failure (Shergold 2001: 70).2 
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Fig. 1. Growth of the CDEP scheme, 1997–1999 
On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the scheme has had several 
manifestations and that it is only recently that it has been viewed, and assessed 
on the basis of being a vehicle for moving people into mainstream employment 
(Sanders 2001). In 2001 the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC) convened a workshop to discuss possible alternative and appropriate 
ways of assessing CDEP schemes in remote regions, given that in such areas 
mainstream labour markets are, and probably always will be, limited. 
While not denying that the scheme may leave people economically dependent on 
welfare transfers, some have suggested that it also allows communities and 
participants a degree of independence from government and the mainstream 
labour market, in terms of the form and style of work that they might undertake 
(Arthur 2001; Rowse 2001; Sanders 1988). That is to say, the scheme may, at one 
level, increase people’s decision-making power or political autonomy. This paper 
explores the question of whether it is legitimate to consider such political 
autonomy as a measure of the scheme’s success, even if it rests on continuing 
welfare dependency. 
Alternative views of welfare and economic dependence 
Dependency, autonomy, self-determination and similar concepts are often 
regarded as absolutes and as being unidimensional. People are either dependent 
or not; or when they are economically dependent this rules out the notion that 
they might realise other forms of independence (Jackson 1990: 29). The work of 
the philosopher Isaiah Berlin allows for a wider view. Berlin proposed, for 
example, that the concept of liberty should be considered in two forms, namely 
the negative and the positive. Negative liberty is a situation where people have the 
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power to stop others, such as the government, interfering in their affairs and 
actions (Crocker 1980: 1; Galipeau 1994: 88–92). Negative autonomy is therefore 
about being autonomous from the intrusion or the interference of others. Positive 
liberty, meanwhile, is defined more by what people can actually do for themselves 
(Crocker 1980: 2). It is about having the power to take actions and to be proactive 
(Galipeau 1994: 88, 104; Jackson 1990: 29). Therefore, positive autonomy is 
about having the power to do something, to take and generate actions, rather 
than just being autonomous from the interference of others. 
The distinction between negative and positive autonomy has been used by Robert 
Jackson to explain the political and economic situation of postcolonial states 
(1990: 11). He argues that in former times states tended to have both negative 
and positive autonomy and were relatively independent in most senses of the 
word. He finds that this is not the case for many new states created during 
postwar decolonisation. These new states gained political independence, but they 
became dependent on international economic aid for their existence (Jackson 
1990: 112). This is largely because political autonomy is something that could be 
given (or given back) by the international community and colonial powers, 
whereas economic autonomy is not, since economic power depends on resources 
and access to markets rather than on political or moral will (Jackson 1990: 30). 
Thus while many postcolonial states are relatively free from outside political 
interference, they remain economically dependent on outside aid. Referring to 
Berlin’s thesis, Jackson proposes that these new states usually have negative 
autonomy (autonomy from) but rarely have positive autonomy (autonomy to). This 
proposition allows that it is legitimate to conceive of situations where political 
autonomy and economic dependence can coexist. 
I have already indicated that people within the CDEP scheme have largely 
remained economically dependent (on welfare). However, the scheme has several 
features that can be said to have increased Indigenous political autonomy at 
several levels and, to a lesser degree, Indigenous economic autonomy. 
CDEP and political autonomy 
Increased political autonomy for communities 
The CDEP scheme effectively increases the political autonomy of Indigenous 
communities and organisations by transferring to them some control that was 
previously held by government agencies. For instance, when people receive 
normal unemployment payments their primary relationship is with a government 
agency, namely Centrelink. In this arrangement the unemployed person is 
required to satisfy Centrelink that they are eligible to receive their payments 
(Arthur 2001; Rowse 2001: 43). The controlling power is held by the govern- 
ment agency.  
This situation is changed in the CDEP scheme. Under the scheme, funds 
equivalent to people’s unemployment benefits, plus on-costs, are transferred to 
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the community or Indigenous organisation which then employs the participants. 
The community organisation becomes an employer, and the participant an 
employee. In many cases, the schemes operate on a no-work, no-pay rule, and 
this arguably increases the community’s authority or power (Arthur 2001; Rowse 
2001: 40, 43). Although the individual is still subject to some control, it now lies 
in the hands of the Indigenous community rather than with an outside 
government agency (Sanders 1988: 43). This transfer of power from a government 
department to an Indigenous community council or organisation arguably 
increases the political autonomy of the latter. 
In addition, like other employers, communities participating in the CDEP scheme 
must devise the work that participants will do (Martin 2001: 32; Rowse 2001: 40; 
Sanders 1988). This work is often associated with community public works and 
maintenance such as that normally carried out by local governments. Although at 
one level this represents an added responsibility for the community, it also 
increases the community council’s ability to decide on, and to plan the 
development of, some of its infrastructure. That is to say, it makes communities 
relatively more autonomous of government by giving them greater power to decide 
on and to implement aspects of community development. 
CDEPs are relatively large operations. At 30 June 2000 there were some 280 
CDEP schemes across the country, ranging in size from 13 to 788 participants. 
More than 80 per cent had between 20 and 199 participants, and 14 per cent had 
more than 200 participants. Whereas Australian businesses are predominantly 
small, having between 1 and 19 employees (Department of Employment, 
Workplace Relations and Small Business 1998), CDEP schemes are 
predominantly either medium sized, with 20 to 200 employees, or large, with 
more than 200 employees (Table 1). It seems reasonable to suggest that managing 
and finding employment for operations of the size of the average CDEP requires 
some considerable organisation, and undoubtedly increases the skills levels and 
managerial capabilities of community councils and the staff of CDEP 
organisations.3 Arguably, it furthers their ability to operate more autonomously in 
the future. 
Table 1. The proportion of Australian firms and CDEP schemes by the 
number of their employees or participants 
Number of employees/participants 
Size of 
business 
% of CDEP 
schemes 
% of Australian 
firms 
0 to 19   Small 2.6 93.0 
20 to 199  Medium 83.4 6.5
200 and over  Large 14.0 0.5
Source: ATSIC (CDEP section); ABS 2001. 
CDEP appears to increase community autonomy in other ways. For example, 
schemes can give community councils the power to create apprenticeships, 
training positions, and full time jobs in community schools, health centres, and 
day-care centres (Arthur and David-Petero 2000). In these cases, the council uses 
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CDEP to share the cost of full-time jobs or training positions with the relevant 
government agency funding the facilities, such as the community school. In other 
cases, CDEP gives communities and organisations the wherewithal to seed and 
support small businesses and activities which might otherwise not be 
commercially viable (Altman & Johnson 2000; Gray & Thacker 2000; Madden 
2000; Smith 1994, 1996; Spicer 1997: 66). 
It has also been argued that the scheme provides communities and their 
residents with the autonomy to make more culturally-based decisions about the 
form of work they will undertake. Tim Rowse has described the CDEP scheme as:  
a buffer against the compulsion for ways of life to be re-fashioned to meet the 
demands of the mainstream labour markets … [T]he subsidy of welfare schemes 
such as CDEP enables Indigenous Australians to exercise greater control over the 
many pressures they are subject to, such as the pressure to enter the mainstream 
economy as wage earners or entrepreneurs (Rowse 1994: 158). 
Increased economic autonomy for individuals 
CDEP may also increase the economic autonomy of participants. Normally, CDEP 
participants only work for part of the week and their wage is the equivalent of an 
unemployment benefit. However, communities can also arrange for some 
participants to increase their work hours and so receive a higher wage. On 
average, people on CDEP have incomes between 14 and 55 per cent higher than 
those on standard unemployment benefits (Altman, Gray & Sanders 2000: 357). 
These higher incomes effectively increase the economic power of individuals. 
Increased political autonomy for ATSIC 
The CDEP scheme can also be said to result in some greater political autonomy 
for ATSIC, which administers the scheme. Normal unemployment benefits are the 
fiscal responsibility of mainstream departments like the Department of Family 
and Community Services and Centrelink. CDEP meanwhile is administered 
through ATSIC. The annual expenditure on CDEP is around $424 million, which 
is in the region of 40 per cent of ATSIC’s total operating budget and this alone will 
add significantly to ATSIC’s economic influence (ATSIC 2000: 22). In addition, 
decisions over the allocation of the CDEP funds are made centrally by ATSIC’s 
commissioners, and regionally by its elected regional councils. Without CDEP, 
any decision-making powers over the equivalent funds would lie with government 
agencies. Therefore, as well as representing a transfer of economic power from the 
government to communities as employers, CDEP represents a similar transfer of 
power to ATSIC’s commissioners and regional councils. 
However, not all commentators feel that CDEP contributes to Indigenous political 
autonomy. Some have pointed out that because many CDEP administrators are 
non-Indigenous, this increases dependency on non-Indigenous staff rather than 
increasing Indigenous autonomy (Altman & Taylor 1989: 49). Yet others have 
noted that where CDEP is administered through an Indigenous organisation, the 
locus of autonomy is in the organisation and not the community (Arthur 1990). 
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The point can also be made that autonomy gained by the community council can 
be at the expense of the autonomy of individuals or family groups. In addition, 
relatively new CDEP management systems, such as the ‘CDEP Manager’, make 
ATSIC more accountable to Centrelink (Altman 2001: 2). All of the above caveats 
are true, but in part only illustrate the relative nature of autonomy. Arguably, 
CDEP gives communities and their councils and organisations a level of 
autonomy not available within the mainstream welfare system. 
Conclusion: negative and positive autonomy 
I have argued that CDEP increases the political autonomy of Indigenous 
communities and ATSIC (see also Rowse 2001: 39). I have also noted that it can, 
to a degree, increase individual economic autonomy. Indeed, we can suggest that 
it is the gain in political autonomy at the community level which makes this 
possible; the two are related. On the other hand, in remote Australia, few of the 
jobs and activities that are presently supported by CDEP are being replaced with 
jobs in the mainstream labour market. This is largely because remote locations 
usually suffer from limited resources and labour markets and this is a difficult set 
of circumstances to change. For this reason remote Indigenous communities will 
probably continue to remain economically dependent on outside welfare-based 
assistance such as CDEP. Therefore, is it valid to propose that CDEPs increase 
political autonomy when they appear to be based on such economic dependence? 
Jackson’s application of Berlin’s separation of autonomy into negative and 
positive elements may help answer this question. Jackson uses the idea of 
negative and positive autonomy to explain the situation he observed in 
postcolonial states. He characterised the autonomy these states had achieved as 
negative because it has reduced interference from outside influences. This 
negative autonomy was largely political and existed while the states were also 
dependent on external economic aid. Importantly then these two dimensions of 
autonomy were not mutually exclusive: that is to say, one can have negative 
autonomy without having positive autonomy. Or, using Jackson’s schema, people 
can have political autonomy even if they are economically dependent. 
We can see some similarity with the Indigenous situation as I have described it. 
The CDEP scheme appears to give Indigenous communities and ATSIC a form of 
autonomy. This might be characterised as negative autonomy: it tends to reduce 
government intervention because it transfers some of the power to make decisions 
about funding and employment from government agencies to communities. Since 
it has to do with the power to make decisions, it is largely political autonomy. 
However, it occurs and is likely to continue to occur, at least in remote 
communities, within a field of economic dependence on welfare transfers.  
At the beginning of this paper I noted that ATSIC is considering what measures 
might be relevant and legitimate for assessing the CDEP scheme’s outcomes. In 
general the scheme is judged only by economic outcomes, and in particular by its 
ability to reduce welfare dependency. The scheme does not reduce welfare and so 
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is generally thought to be failing. This, I would argue, is because dependency and 
its mirror, autonomy, are largely seen as only having one legitimate dimension—
the economic. This tends to suggest that forms of autonomy can only be 
considered valid when economic dependency is reduced or removed. The 
approach proposed here is that autonomy, and by extension dependence, can 
legitimately be considered as having at least two dimensions: the political and the 
economic. Moreover, these are not contingent on each other; rather, they can 
coexist. This allows us to accept that there can be political autonomy where there 
is continuing economic dependence. Such an approach legitimises political 
autonomy as a measure of the success of CDEP, even in those cases where there 
is little or no reduction in economic dependence.4 
 
Notes 
1. It is this aspect of the welfare system that has recently led Noel Pearson to 
characterise it as destructive (Pearson 2000: 38). 
2.  The same commentator noted that out of more than 30,000 participants only 180 
(less than 1%) had moved into mainstream employment (Shergold 2001: 70). 
3.  Although outside the scope of this paper, it may be instructive to compare managerial 
and work practices across the categories shown in Table 1. 
4.  Although this paper has focused on the notion of autonomy, the same principles could 
also be applied to self determination. Indeed, some commentators have already moved 
in this direction by arguing that self determination is a form of negative autonomy 
(Beran 1994: 3; Jackson 1990: 6, 27). Thus, it is legitimate to consider that political 
self determination can exist inside economic dependence on welfare (see Rowse 2001: 
42). 
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